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“‘I have been consistently informed by multiple career people at E.P.A. that
Administrator Pruitt is not meeting with them ahead of making decisions 
like rolling back these major regulations,’ said James J. Jones, who had worked at
the agency since the Reagan administration before retiring in January. . . .
Instead, Mr. Pruitt has outsourced crucial work to a network of lawyers, lobbyists
and other allies . . . .”1 
* © 2018 David A. Dana.  Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern 
University Pritzker School of Law. 
** © 2018 Michael Barsa.  Professor of Practice, Northwestern University Pritzker 
School of Law.
1.  Coral Davenport, Counseled by Industry, Not Staff, E.P.A. Chief is Off to a 
Blazing Start, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/us/politics/
trump-epa-chief-pruitt-regulations-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/47NJ-8RAB].
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U.S. EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt is leading a formal initiative to challenge
mainstream climate science using a “back-and-forth critique” by government-
recruited experts, according to a senior administration official. . . . Climate scientists
express concern that the “red team, blue team” concept could politicize scientific
research and disproportionately elevate the views of a relatively small number
of experts who disagree with mainstream scientists.2 
“[The] Trump administration is in [an] unending battle for ‘deconstruction
of the administrative state[.]’”3 
We live in an age of hyper-polarization in the United States, in which
Democrats and Republicans increasingly lack common ground as to what
the government should or should not do.4  Moreover, partisan disagreement 
is not limited to values, but also directly implicates facts.  Republicans and 
Democrats increasingly have different understandings of the underlying facts 
that are relevant to government policies.5 
The pattern of polarization is not symmetric, however.  One recent study
suggests that while the views of Democrats in social media have moved
somewhat to the left, the views of Republicans in social media have shifted
 2. Emily Holden, Pruitt Will Launch Program to ‘Critique’ Climate Science, E&E
NEWS (June 30, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060056858 [https://perma.cc/
REU7-W86C].
 3. Philip Rucker, Bannon: Trump Administration is in Unending Battle for
‘Deconstruction of the Administrative State’, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/02/23/bannon-trump-administration-is-
in-unending-battle-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/?utm_term=.33311b72fe96
[https://perma.cc/3B4S-47LH] (quoting Bannon). 
4. See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Is Polarization a Myth?, 70 
J. OF POL. 542, 542–54 (2008) (finding substantial evidence of polarization); see also Political 
Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.people-
press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/ [https://perma.cc/2BCS-
GAEC]; Alexander George Theodoridis, The Hyper-Polarization of America, SCI. AM. (Nov.
7, 2016), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/the-hyper-polarization-of-america/
[https://perma.cc/T5EA-LFSS]; Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix 
of Fake News, Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 57, 59–61 (2017). 
5. See Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin & Paul
Slovic, The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate 
Change Risks, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, May 27, 2012, at 1, 2, 4–5, http://www.nature. 
com/nclimate/journal/v2/n10/full/nclimate1547.html?foxtrotcallback=true [https://perma.cc/
F5N5-LNMY] (the Democratic/Republican split on facts mirrors the divides that Dan Kahan
and other researchers have discovered using the framework of cultural cognition, in which
the relevant categories include hierarchalists/authoritarians and egalitarians/communitarians);
see also Olga Khazan, How to Overcome Political Irrationality About Facts, THE ATLANTIC  
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/01/how-curiosity-bursts-
our-political-bubbles/514451/ [https://perma.cc/YB8M-WLAN] (discussing intense polarization 
as to facts and possible means to reduce it).
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very far to the right.6  Moreover, within the Republican party—especially 
its ascendant conservative wing—facts that are rooted in well-established 
science, that can be verified using scientific method, are increasingly
disregarded in favor of what a leading Republican spokesman famously
defended as “alternative facts.”7 The degradation of factual discourse does 
not seem to be a transitory phenomenon. Rather, it appears to be a reflection 
of contemporary features of American life, including the prevalence of social 
media, income inequality, and residential geographic segregation by class,
political affiliations, and social background.8 
This hyper-polarization and tendency to embrace “alternative facts” on 
one end of the political spectrum has implications for judicial review of 
administrative agencies. A principal rationale for deferential judicial review 
is that agencies are technocratic experts.  Courts, as non-experts, defer to
agencies in part because they trust the integrity of agencies’ technical analyses 
and judgment. But in an age of hyper-polarization, deference based on 
agencies’ technical competence is less justified. Courts cannot now readily 
assume that agencies’ technical, expert, “factual” analyses and conclusions
are well-supported.  Deference based on technocratic expertise is particularly 
questionable when an agency shifts its position after an election by rejecting 
the previous administration’s policy and adopting a dramatically different
one. Such policy swings typically occur around focal points of partisan
6. Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, Hal Roberts & Ethan Zuckerman, Study: Breitbart-
Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered Broader Media Agenda, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM
REV. (Mar. 3, 2017), www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php 
[https://perma.cc/GG9C-DDT5]; see also Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, How
the Republicans Broke Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/12/ 
02/opinion/sunday/republicans-broke-congress-politics.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/T48K-
AVFM] (explaining that the Republican Party has moved farther from a “truth” based
approach to governance than the Democratic Party, to the nation’s detriment).
7. See Conway: Press Secretary Gave ‘Alternative Facts’, NBCNEWS.COM (Jan.
22, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/conway-press-secretary-gave-
alternative-facts-860142147643 [https://perma.cc/CT3Q-TVCU (depicting White House senior
advisor Kellyanne Conway as saying: “You’re saying it’s a falsehood . . . our press secretary
gave alternative facts to that.”).
8. For discussions of the role of these factors in creating polarization, see CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 76–85 (2017);
John V. Duca and Jason L. Saving, Income Inequality and Political Polarization: Time 
Series Evidence Over Nine Decades, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 464–65 (2016),
https:// www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/papers/2014/wp1408.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
APC5-E299]; Ian Chipman, Political Polarization’s Geographic Roots Run Deep, STANDARD 
BUS. (May 2, 2017), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/political-polarizations-
geographic-roots-run-deep [https://perma.cc/HLT9-AY97]. 
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hyper-polarization—it is with respect to such focal point issues that the
assumption of technocratic competence is least tenable.9 
Building on this insight about the effects of hyper-polarization, we
argue for a re-assessment of how courts review administrative agency changes
in policy.10 While some precedent suggests that agencies face an especially 
“hard look” when they deviate from past practices or approaches, the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.11 
is generally read as establishing the same level of deferential review when 
an agency shifts course as when it stays the course or addresses an issue
for the very first time.12  And, as a normative matter, scholars have argued
for deferential review regarding agency shifts so as to avoid agency “ossification”
and bureaucratic inertia, and so as to give effect to the values of the party
that just won power because, in a democracy, elections must matter.13
 9. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 56–57 (2011), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/view 
content.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1166&context=nulr 
(“. . .  the timing of an agency decision—for instance, the completion of a regulation right 
before a president leaves office or a withdrawal of a proposed rule immediately after a
new president comes into office—may suggest that the action is “arbitrary and capricious” 
under the APA” in that the timing reflects political imperatives, rather than technocratic ones).
See Nick Rowley, Australia’s Climate Policy is Messier than a Teenager’s Bedroom, but
is Turnbull the Man to Tidy it Up?, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 8, 2015), https://theconversation.
com/australias-climate-policy-is-messier-than-a-teenagers-bedroom-but-is-turnbull-the-
man-to-tidy-it-up-48809 [https://perma.cc/T6HY-HN7F]; see also Helena Afonso (Associate 
Economic Affairs Officer, UN/DESA), et al., UN-DESA Policy Brief #48: Adaptation to
Climate Change Requires Transformative Policies (Sept. 2016) (arguing that effective climate 
adaptation requires coherent, long-term strategies), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/
wp-content/uploads/sites/45/post/WESS2016-PB5.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MUN-VVLA].
10. Allison Orr Larsen makes a similar argument, but focused not on review of agency
action but rather on constitutional review of legislation premised on purported facts. See
Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
175 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=303303 [https://perma.cc/
W8DK-QPDA].
11.  FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
12. See, e.g., Ronald Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 
65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 555, 573 (2011) (“The Court’s position on the issue comes down to 
this: Unless reliance interests or inconsistent readings of a factual record are involved,
open acknowledgment of the change and a defense of the new policy on its own terms 
should ordinarily suffice.”), https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer= 
https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1159&context=umlr [https://perma.cc/
G4BG-QTW2].
13. See id. (arguing that Fox appropriately allows agencies the room they need to 
reflect the change in values of the incoming or new Administration); Randy J. Kozel & 
Jeffrey A. Pojaniowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 132 (2011) (“One
common approach has been to read Chevron as cutting against heightened review of 
administrative change: Agency positions are not ‘carved in stone,’ and Chevron’s 
assumption of capacious administrative discretion to interpret statutes applies to revisions 
just as it does to initial rulings.”), http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
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Nonetheless, we believe that Fox need not—and should not—be read to
preclude courts from adopting the kind of judicial review our age of hyper- 
polarization justifies.  In particular, Fox supports courts holding agencies 
to a high standard in explaining why the facts that a previous administration 
relied upon are no longer true or relevant or no longer weigh heavily in favor 
of conclusions reached by the previous administration.  Notably, nothing 
in Fox prevents courts from either seriously questioning an agency about 
what new facts support its recent policy change, or from interrogating the
basis for those newly claimed facts. A broad but fair reading of Fox also
supports courts calling on agencies to meaningfully explain how their shifts 
will affect reliance interests, broadly understood, and how the agencies sought, 
if they did, to meaningfully take account of those reliance interests.  We 
seek here to rebut recent claims that current case law allows an agency almost
unlimited discretion to discard the rules adopted during a previous presidential
administration.14 
Hyper-polarization also has implications beyond the courts in the drafting 
of legislation and regulation. In particular, the drafters of legislation and 
regulation face a dilemma when they seek to fashion a provision that
allows or requires implementing agencies to periodically review their own 
regulations and to determine their continuing appropriateness.  On the one
hand, such provisions seem sensible as tools to address problems of bureaucratic 
=1447&context=law_faculty_scholarship [http://perma.cc/C5DS-QQ2B]; Miriam Seifter,
Judicial Review of Agency Change, 127 HARV.L. REV.2070, 2091 (2014) (“This Note suggests
that the standard should be deferential and accept rational agency attempts to reconcile their
precedents. Courts may need to adapt this general standard to suit particular regulatory contexts.”),
http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/vol127_judicial_review_of_agency_
change.pdf [https://perma.cc/; but see David H. Becker, Changing Direction in Administrative 
Agency Rulemaking: “Reasoned Analysis,” The Roadless Rule Repeal, and the 2006 National
Park Service Management Policies, 30 ENVIRONS. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 65 (Fall 2006) (arguing, 
pre Fox, that agencies do and should use State Farm to scrutinize agency shifts in policy),
https://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/volumes/30/1/becker.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4FD-P4B4]; see
also infra note 25 (discussing the agency ossification debate).  For her part, Short sees Fox
as representing a possible shift toward allowing political-reason-giving as a basis of agency
action and thus allowing the agency to in effect enjoy broader deference, but it is unclear 
if she sees Fox as changing the review applicable to all agency action or only the review 
applicable to agency shifts in position; see Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American 
Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1829 (2012), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&
httpsredir=1&article=1540&context=dlj [https://perma.cc/VU6G-PNL5].
14. See infra note 110 (discussing the Trump Administration’s reliance on the idea
that agencies have an inherent power to reconsider and set aside rules adopted by a previous
administration). 
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inertia and as means to encourage agencies to flexibly respond to new
information and circumstances.  From a technocratic, “good government,” 
non-polarized-politics, idealized-public-interest perspective, the case is
clear for requiring periodic agency review and encouraging agencies to adapt 
policy to altered circumstances.  The Supreme Court itself, in a less polarized 
era, acknowledged as much.15 On the other hand, in an age of hyper-
polarization, such flexibility-enhancing provisions can be invitations to the
wholesale, immediate undoing of regulations without meaningful process 
or analysis by a new administration that represents a different political party 
than its predecessor.
The effectiveness of judicial review in an age of hyper-polarization depends 
in part on whether flexibility-enhancing provisions in statutes and regulations 
formally require agencies to make factual determinations as part of their
process for determining whether to alter current policies. Such specific fact- 
finding requirements allow—and indeed push—judges to require agencies 
to assemble meaningful factual records before dramatically shifting policy.
If such fact-finding requirements are written into law and enforced by courts, 
there is a greater likelihood that, even in an era of hyper-polarization, technical 
competence grounded in data and scientific method will be a major driver 
of agency behavior over time. 
We develop our argument about judicial review and legislative and regulatory 
drafting in an age of hyper-polarization in the context of a contemporary 
agency controversy—the Trump EPA’s effort to re-open and perhaps roll 
back mileage fuel economy standards adopted and then reviewed and re-
approved by the Obama EPA.  The Trump EPA’s effort has not yet reached
the courts, so we offer a roadmap of how courts might evaluate that effort 
and the justifications for different approaches.  We also use the case study 
to illustrate how regulation drafters, if they aspire to ensure a continuous 
practice of fact-based decisionmaking, should tie provisions for regulatory
flexibility to formal fact-finding requirements that the agency must satisfy. 
For the fuel economy standards, the review provision in the applicable regulation, 
while unobjectionable enough on its face, was not well-advised from the
perspective of ensuring continuity in fact-based decisionmaking.16 
This Article is organized as follows: Part I reviews the case law and 
commentary on judicial review of agency shifts in policy or practice, focusing
on the technocratic case for deference and how recent political realities 
15. See, e.g., American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe RR Co., et al., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967) (“Regulatory agencies do not establish 
rules of conduct to last forever; they are supposed . . . to adapt their rules and practices to
the Nation’s needs in a volatile, changing economy. They are neither required nor supposed to
regulate the present and the future within the inflexible limits of yesterday.”).
 16. See infra notes 88–90. 
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call such deference into question. Part II sets forth the background and history
regarding fuel economy standards, leading to the Obama Administration’s 
adoption of standards in 2012 and the “midterm” review of those standards
that Obama’s EPA declared final as of January 2017. Part II also reviews 
the legal issues surrounding Trump’s EPA’s “re-opening” of the midterm 
review. We suggest how courts could, and should, consider any forthcoming 
dilution in the standards proposed by EPA. Part III takes up objections to
our call for a less deferential judicial posture and, in particular, considers
the objection that judges themselves may be hyper-polarized. Part III also 
considers whether judges simply lack the capacity to ferret out the difference
between “alternative facts” and actual facts. 
We readily acknowledge that judicial detachment and competencies
have limits but maintain that, overall, we all will be better off if judges take a
genuinely hard look at agency policy shifts and thereby encourage agencies
to operate in the shadow of such scrutiny.  Such review could prompt agencies 
to ground their policy shifts in a considered account of why the available 
facts better support a new policy rather than the previous one and, if they
cannot do that, to forego policy shifts. Alternatively, such review could
lead agencies to disclaim a factual basis for their policy shifts and instead 
explain those shifts in terms of their values and ideology, inviting the 
courts to decide whether those values and ideology are permissible bases
for changing policy under substantive statutes and the Administrative
Procedure Act.17  We think either of these effects would be preferable
to judicial rubber-stamping of agency decisions that are purportedly based
17. We recognize that there are many potential problems in encouraging agencies
to justify policy shifts in terms of changed values or ideology. For one thing, some ideology
(for example, an ideology that views the poor as non-earners whose needs government 
affirmatively should disregard a la Ayn Rand) should be deemed irrational or arbitrary
under the APA, and almost certainly would be by any court, yet that ideology really might 
be at work in proposals to reduce social welfare benefits.  Because agencies would not 
want to offer values or ideology motivations that would generate negative publicity and/or 
lead a court to find a violation of the APA or a substantive statute, they might offer the courts
“fake” but seemingly innocuous values or ideology rationales or ones that are so vague 
that they afford no opportunity for meaningful judicial review. See Short, supra note 13,
at 1853–56. Short also suggests, without necessarily endorsing the position, that requiring
agencies to offer factual or technical reasons for their actions fosters public dialogue more 
than allowing them to rely on political reason-giving. Id. at 1823 (“Finally, reason giving 
legitimates the exercise of administrative power. Civic republicans and others partial to
deliberative-democratic models of agency legitimacy see reasons as a mechanism for facilitating 
dialogue toward the end of generating public consensus around policy outcomes.”). 
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on factu
justification. 
al or technical criteria but in reality lack factual or technical 
I. DEFERENCE, STATE FARM AND FOX
Why should courts defer to the decisions of agencies?  This is a foundational 
question for any discussion of judicial review of agency action.  The leading 
modern precedent on deference, Chevron v. EPA,18 articulates two rationales
that dominate academic discourse—political accountability and technical
expertise. The first rationale resonates in political theory: agencies—at least 
non-independent agencies—are more politically accountable than Article 
III courts, to the extent they reflect the politics of the presidential administration 
in power. Hence, it is appropriate that agencies have discretion to act where 
the statutory directives to the agency are ambiguous.19 
This political rationale is arguably problematic insofar as it undercuts the
role of Congress in directing agencies through legislation. Moreover, agencies 
generally do not invoke the political rationale in explaining their shifts in 
position.
Instead, agencies frame shifts in terms of changing data and circumstances 
in the world (including sometimes new statutes and precedents).20 In other 
words, agencies tend to rely on technocratic arguments in justifying their
shifts in position—and little wonder, because superior technical expertise 
is a virtually uncontested reason for judicial deference. Moreover, legislation 
is sometimes structured so as to require that an agency make a determination
18.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. RES. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
19. Id. at 865; see also Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political 
Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 473 (2011) (“At the most general level, courts tend 
to use one of two theories of agencies to justify deference to agency decisions . . . political 
accountability . . . [and] expertise”). This democratic-theory argument has proponents, 
notably Elena Kagan, at least before she joined the Court, see Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2384 (2001) (“Presidential administration . . . 
advances political accountability by subjecting the bureaucracy to the control mechanism 
most open to public examination and most responsive to public opinion.”), but also notable 
detractors, especially since the election of Donald Trump. See e.g., Daniel Farber,
Presidential Administration Under Trump, U.C. BERKELEY PUB. L. RES. PAPERS (Aug. 9,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015591 [https://perma.cc/ 
P2X8-MXP5].
20. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing A Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009) (“agencies today tend to sweep political influences under 
the rug even when such influences offer the most rational explanation for the action.”).
Arguably, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29 (1983), encouraged agencies to justify their actions in rationalistic, technocratic, 
evidence-based terms, rather than relying on political or political accountability reasons. 
See Short, supra note 13, at 1820 (“State Farm adopted the ‘“rationalist” model of reason
giving’ in which the onus on the agency is ‘to compile evidence supporting [its] reasons’
and ‘consider, analyze, and reject contrary evidence’”).
238
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that implicates some technocratic expertise, such as the Clean Air Act
requirement that EPA make a finding as to whether a pollutant endangers 
public health or welfare.21 
The more technocratic or scientific the question upon which an agency 
has taken a position, the more exuberantly courts proclaim the need for 
deference. The Supreme Court’s statement in Baltimore Gas is typical: 
“When the agency ‘is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, 
at the frontiers of science . . . a reviewing court must generally be at its 
most deferential.’”22 The Ninth Circuit also recently articulated this view: 
“Deference to the informed discretion of the responsible Federal Agencies 
is especially important, where, as here, the agency’s decision involves a
high level of technical expertise.”23 
Unsurprisingly, the Trump Administration is trumpeting the deference-
to-technical-expertise argument in seeking to undo Obama Administration 
policies. One example is EPA’s recent decision to partially stay a June
2016 Clean Air Act rule regarding methane omissions from oil and gas 
extraction facilities.  Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas and thus a
contributor to climate change; methane emissions in oil and gas drilling 
also are associated with the release of certain toxic chemicals.24  In arguing 
to the DC Circuit that EPA did not need to engage in a new rulemaking in 
order to stay and reconsider the methane rule, the Trump Administration 
did not invoke a conception of procedural autonomy for an agency, nor
did it rest its case on the legitimacy of a shift in political values between
 21. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a)(1) (“The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe 
(and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards 
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles
or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”). 
22. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
23. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 798 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (noting, however, that even in highly technical matters, deference to agencies
is not unlimited, and citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 103). 
24. See generally, Methane Pollution from the Oil & Gas Industry Harms Public 
Health, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (last visited Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/ 
files/content/methane_rule_ health_fact_sheet_reboot_final_no_citations.pdf  [https://
perma.cc/7RWV-UGUA]; Gayathri Vaidyanathan, How Bad of a Greenhouse Gas is
Methane?, SCI. AM. (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-
bad-of-a-greenhouse-gas-is-methane/ [https://perma.cc/L4XX-2XBH]; Phil McKenna,
The EPA’s Natural Gas Problem, PBS (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/
next/earth/methane-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/9F66-7TS6]; Center for Biological Diversity,
Natural Gas Fact Sheet (last visited Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/
climate_law_institute/pdfs/NaturalGasFactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MHK-7T3B].
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the Obama and Trump Administrations with respect to the question of 
climate change.  Instead, the Trump Administration argued deference to the
technical expertise of the agency. In its brief, EPA emphasized that “courts
are at their ‘most deferential’ when an agency evaluates scientific or technical 
matters,” and argued that “[t]he questions presented here are factual in 
nature and fall with EPA’s special expertise to assess the scientific and
other issues in the comments it received and determine what issues were,
could have, and could not have been raised.”25 
Among academics, the most powerful recent defense of deferential
review—including deferential review of agency shifts in positions—is 
Jacob Gerson’s and Adrean Vermeule’s Thin Rationality.  The authors 
argue that courts engage in thin rationality review and should continue to
so.26  Part of their argument is based on the idea that the gap in technical 
expertise between courts and administrative agencies is so great that agencies 
cannot fully explain their decisions.  This discrepancy thus justifies the tendency
by courts to require very little of the agencies, by way of explanation. The 
authors explain: “[I] n many fields, experts have tacit knowledge that they
cannot communicate, at least at acceptable cost, to generalist observers or 
other nonexperts. Tacit knowledge is how-to local knowledge. . . . Because 
such knowledge is ubiquitous, there is always a question whether those 
who can do something are able to explain how they do it.  Those who can do 
often can’t teach. . . .”27  They also suggest that agencies are best at confronting 
questions of genuine uncertainty that are rife in policymaking and for which
there are no purely objective, fact-based, certain answers.28 
The problem with deference to either the implicit or explicit technical 
expertise of administrative agencies—and in particular extreme deference
to agency judgments regarding questions involving technical and scientific
complexity and uncertainty—is that it assumes that an agency is, in good 
25.   Respondent’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for a Stay or, in
the Alternative, Summary Vacatur, at 15–16, Clean Air Council v. EPA, No. 17-1145 (D.C. Cir. 
June 15, 2017).
26. Jacob Gersen & Adriene Vermuele, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1355 (2016) (arguing for something like thin rationality review as a means to free up scarce
agency resources and allow for more collaboration among agencies and stakeholders); see
also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Arbitrariness Review Made Reasonable, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 331 (2016) (arguing that a less restrictive arbitrariness review
would address the problem that judicial review imposes high costs on resource-constrained 
agencies); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (same); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real:
A Response to “Testing the Ossification Hypothesis,” 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493 (2012) 
(same); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 9 n.19 (1997) (arguing that deferential judicial review is valuable as a means to 
facilitating collaborative governance). 
27.  Gersen & Vermuele, supra note 26, at 1396. 
28. Id. at 1359. 
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faith, exercising its expertise.  Such deference assumes that agency expertise
actually informs and constrains agency judgments, even if ideology also 
plays a role. But this assumption cannot carry as much weight as it might
have in a different time.  Now, we live in a hyper-polarized world where
the previous administration’s efforts must, by definition, be deemed wrong 
by the new administration and where accepted scientific methods and 
evidence-based approaches may not always be deemed superior to alternative
facts. The case for highly deferential review loses some of its grounding
when framed in the political world we inhabit today.  In such a world, courts 
should have a larger role in reviewing the agency’s factual analyses,
notwithstanding judges’ obvious disadvantages as non-expert generalists. 
Does current law allow a court to engage in meaningful, searching review 
of agency shifts in policy?  The answer is yes.  As discussed below, State 
Farm29 provides the clearest example of the Supreme Court calling on an 
agency to explain why the facts the agency previously relied upon no 
longer matter after an election brings a new party into power in the White 
House. State Farm is perhaps even more apt in today’s polarized world 
than when it was decided.  The Supreme Court decision in Fox seems to 
alter the State Farm standard for judicial review of agency shifts, but, read 
closely, Fox allows for essentially the same kind of review that the Court 
employed in State Farm. Moreover, a recent Supreme Court case that addressed 
Fox, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,30 supports this reading of Fox. 
State Farm involved a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
order requiring the installation of passive restraints (airbags or automatic
seat belts) in cars. The rationale for the NHTSA requirement was, in large 
part, that passive restraints would save enough lives to justify the cost.
The Reagan Administration’s NHTSA withdrew the passive restraint order,
explaining that, contrary to the Carter Administration’s NHTSA, it believed 
automatic belts would save virtually no lives because people would simply
leave them detached.  However, the Reagan NHTSA developed no empirical
evidence for this assumption. Moreover, the Reagan NHTSA did not even 
question the Carter NHTSA’s finding that air bags are an effective life-saving 
device. The Court held NHTSA’s course change arbitrary and capricious 
in an opinion often deemed a quintessential expression of the “hard look” 
29.  463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
30.  136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016). 
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approach to judicial review of agency action.31  As the Court explained,
“[e]xpert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process, but ‘unless 
we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, 
expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster 
which rules with no practical limits on its discretion.’”32 
Fox, decided in 2007, is a fractured decision that cannot be understood
solely by reading the majority opinion. For many years, the FCC provided 
broadcasters a safe harbor against a finding of a violation for a single utterance
of an otherwise prohibited swear word.33  In 2000, the Bush Administration 
FCC shifted course, using an enforcement action involving a Golden Globes 
broadcast to declare that even a single utterance of a swear word could subject
a broadcaster to penalties. In its Golden Globes order, the FCC provided 
essentially empirical reasons to support its rescission of the safe-harbor 
policy and its new policy of citing broadcasters for fleeting expletives.
The FCC argued that categorically exempting fleeting expletives from 
enforcement would encourage widespread use of offensive language by
broadcasters, and in particular, would harm children, who would be forced
to suffer the harmful “first blow” of fleeting profanities.34 
Applying State Farm, the Second Circuit found the FCC shift in policy
unreasoned because the agency did not explain why a single utterance was
harmful, such that it justified  imposing a burden on First Amendment 
expression, when for years the agency’s policy assumed little or no harm.
The Second Circuit also concluded that the agency failed to adequately
explain its view that allowing single utterances would lead to an explosion 
31. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; see also Gerson & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 
1361 (State Farm may be mischaracterized as the touchstone for hard look review). The 
term hard look, however, predates State Farm and originated in a string of D.C. Circuit 
cases, which may or may not have engaged in the same kind of review as State Farm. See
Short, supra note 13, at 1820 n.33; see also Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 
682 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
32. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48 (quoting New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 
884 (1951) (dissenting opinion)).
33. The safe harbor originally may have been adopted in part by the FCC in part to 
comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S 726 (1978), in which 
the Court seemed to rule that the FCC may limit indecent speech, like swear words, but in 
doing so, must focus on the context in which the words are spoken to determine whether
the public interest in preventing children from hearing such words outweighs the First 
Amendment concerns with limiting speech, albeit indecent speech. See id. at 742. 
34. In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing
of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4976 (2004); see also Short, 
supra note 13, at 1825–26 (discussing FCC Golden Globes enforcement action and Fox). 
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of profanity on television, despite the fact that single utterances had been 
allowed for many years.35 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia implicitly rejected the Second 
Circuit’s view that the FCC policy was based on a change in the view of
the FCC as to the harm of single obscene utterances on viewers (especially 
children).  Although the Second Circuit relied on the reasons the FCC itself 
had cited for the policy change, Justice Scalia explained that the agency 
shift simply reflected the correction of an agency misimpression that the
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence compelled a safe harbor for 
single utterances of obscenities. Facts in the world—the extralegal world,
at least—do not figure in the majority opinion, which readily finds the FCC 
shift to be compliant with the APA.  Justice Scalia also addressed the view
that State Farm stands for the proposition that agency shifts in position
warrant closer judicial review than other agency actions.  That view is entirely 
incorrect, according to Justice Scalia:
The Second Circuit has interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act and our
opinion in State Farm as requiring agencies to make clear “‘why the original
reasons for adopting the [displaced] rule or policy are no longer dispositive’” as
well as “‘why the new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the old
rule.’” 489 F.3d, at 456–457 (quoting New York Council, Assn. of Civilian Technicians 
v. FLRA, 757 F.2d 502, 508 (C.A.2 1985) (emphasis deleted). The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has similarly indicated that a court’s standard
of review is “heightened somewhat” when an agency reverses course. NAACP v.
FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 998 (1982). . . . We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure 
Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to
more searching review. The Act mentions no such heightened standard. And our
opinion in State Farm neither held nor implied that every agency action representing
a policy change must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required
to adopt a policy in the first instance.36 
While Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority states that there is the 
same kind of review for agency changes in position as there is for any other 
agency action, the opinion seems to concede that may not be so when the 
agency shift is based on a change in the agency’s assessment of the relevant 
facts. Justice Scalia acknowledges that “[t]o be sure, the requirement that
an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily
 35. See Fox TV, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Christopher
Hiserman, Silencing Fox: The Chilling Effect of the FCC’s Indecent Speech Policy, 52 
B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 15 (2011) (reviewing and defending the Second Circuit’s decision), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/viewcontent.cgi?article=3193&context=bclr/ [https://perma.
cc/58TY-T4XE]. 
36.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009). 
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demand that it display awareness that it is changing position.”37 Moreover, 
an agency must provide “a more detailed justification than what would 
suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate,” in at least two sets of
cases: (1) when “its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict 
those which underlay its prior policy,” and (2) “when its prior policy has 
engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.”38 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence expands on these two sets of cases where 
agency shifts call for searching review.  He indicates that they cover more
terrain of administrative law than Justice Scalia suggests.  In doing so, 
Justice Kennedy suggests that State Farm and Fox are decisions woven from 
the same cloth.  According to Justice Kennedy, “[W]hether a change in policy
requires an agency to provide a more reasoned explanation than when the 
original policy was first announced is not susceptible, in my view, to an 
answer that applies in all cases.”39  In all cases of agency policy shifts, “[t]he 
question . . . is whether the agency’s reasons for the change, when viewed
in light of the data available to it, and when informed by the experience 
and expertise of the agency, suffice to demonstrate that the new policy rests
upon principles that are rational, neutral, and in accord with the agency’s
proper understanding of its authority.”40  Unless agencies are held to account 
for why a change in policy is reasonable in light of their expertise, “their 
actions might violate important constitutional principles of separation of 
powers and checks and balances.”41 
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s opinion specifically affirms that agencies 
must explain both why the data they relied upon in forming their old policy
is no longer relevant and what new data supports the policy now proposed
by the agency.  The agency must explicitly address the facts and evidence 
that were available to and relied upon by the agency during the prior
administration and the facts and evidence now available to and relied upon
by the agency: 
There may be instances when it becomes apparent to an agency that the reasons
for a longstanding policy have been altered by discoveries in science, advances
in technology, or by any of the other forces at work in a dynamic society. If an 
agency seeks to respond to new circumstances by modifying its earlier policy, the 
agency may have a substantial body of data and experience that can shape and
inform the new rule. . . . Where there is a policy change the record may be much
more developed because the agency based its prior policy on factual findings. In
that instance, an agency’s decision to change course may be arbitrary and capricious
if the agency ignores or countermands its earlier factual findings without reasoned
explanation for doing so. An agency cannot simply disregard contrary or inconvenient
 37. Id. at 515. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 536 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
41. Id. (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
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factual determinations that it made in the past, any more than it can ignore 
inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate.42 
When compared to Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence seems to provide more room for judges to apply a searching
review with respect to the factual bases of changes in agency policy.
(Still, even Justice Scalia acknowledges that an agency must explain its 
rationale for adopting a new policy that rests “upon factual findings that 
contradict those which underlay its prior policy.”43) Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence also strongly reaffirms State Farm and suggests that Fox in no
way alters the kind of searching review called for in State Farm: 
This is the principle followed in the Court’s opinion in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. 
of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 103 
S. Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). There, Congress directed the agency to issue 
regulations that would “‘meet the need for motor vehicle safety.’” . . . . The agency
promulgated a regulation requiring cars to have passive-restraint systems—either
airbags or automatic seatbelts. . . . The agency based this regulation on its factual 
finding that these systems save lives. . . . . Following a change in Presidential
administration, however, the agency reversed course and rescinded the regulation. In
doing so, the agency did not address its prior finding that airbags save lives. . . . 
This Court found the agency’s rescission arbitrary and capricious because the agency
did not address its prior factual findings.44 
Justice Kennedy concurred rather than dissented in Fox, because he agreed
with the majority that the FCC change in policy was based on a change in 
the agency’s understanding of the First Amendment constraints imposed
by Supreme Court case law, rather than any extra-legal facts.45  Justice Breyer’s
dissent calls this view into question, essentially making the same arguments 
as the Second Circuit had—namely, that the FCC had not accounted for 
the facts that justified its earlier policy or explained how those facts no longer
applied.46  In Justice Breyer’s view, State Farm compelled affirmance of 
42. Id. at 535–37 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
43. Id. at 515. 
44. Id. at 537–38 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
45. Id. at 535 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
46. Id. at 564 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The FCC points to no empirical (or other)
evidence to demonstrate that it previously understated the importance of avoiding the ‘first 
blow.’ Like the majority, I do not believe that an agency must always conduct full 
empirical studies of such matters. Ante, at 15–16. But the FCC could have referred to, and
explained, relevant empirical studies that suggest the contrary. One review of the empirical 
evidence, for example, reports that ‘[i]t is doubtful that children under the age of 12
understand sexual language and innuendo; therefore it is unlikely that vulgarities have any
negative effect.’ Kaye & Sapolsky, Watch Your Mouth! An Analysis of Profanity Uttered
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the Second Circuit.  But perhaps the most notable part of Justice Breyer’s 
dissent was how it picked up on and clarified a theme found in both Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence—the theme
of reliance interests and how agency shifts in policy must account for such
interests in order to be deemed rational and compliant with the APA.47 
Justice Breyer posed the following hypothetical to underscore his reliance
interest point:
To explain a change requires more than setting forth reasons why the new policy
is a good one. It also requires the agency to answer the question, “Why did you
change?” And a rational answer to this question typically requires a more complete 
explanation than would prove satisfactory were change itself not at issue. An
(imaginary) administrator explaining why he chose a policy that requires driving
on the right side, rather than the left side, of the road might say, “Well, one side
seemed as good as the other, so I flipped a coin.” But even assuming the rationality of
that explanation for an initial choice, that explanation is not at all rational if 
offered to explain why the administrator changed driving practice, from right side 
to left side, 25 years later.48 
Justice Breyer’s point seems to be that reliance interests may be large, 
indeed overwhelming, even if the initial agency policy was or now seems 
otherwise contestable. None of the opinions in Fox address how broadly
reliance interests can be construed for purposes of understanding what an
agency must take account of and explicitly address in shifting policy.  None
of the opinions suggest that reliance interests are necessarily limited to the 
entities directly regulated by the agency in question.  In the real world, entities 
and individuals outside an agency’s regulatory jurisdiction are affected by
and rely upon agency policy. For example, building on Justice Breyer’s
hypothetical, a traffic official who decides that people should drive on the 
right side of the road may have no direct jurisdiction over car manufacturers,
but those manufacturers will design their cars to work best in a right-side 
world if that is what traffic regulations have mandated.  Similarly, EPA and 
NHTSA have no direct jurisdiction over entities that invest in the development 
of electronic batteries for cars or other fuel-economy-enhancing technology, 
but those entities are very much affected by the fuel economy standards
promulgated by the agencies.
The relevance of reliance interests—and Fox as a basis for meaningful 
judicial review—are underscored by Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
by Children on Prime-Time Television, 2004 MASS COMMUNICATION & SOC’Y 429, 433 
(Vol. 7) (citing two studies). The Commission need not have accepted this conclusion. But 
its failure to discuss this or any other such evidence, while providing no empirical evidence
at all that favors its position, must weaken the logical force of its conclusion.”).
47. Id. at 551–52 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
48. Id. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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majority in Encino Motorcars.49  In that case, relying on Fox, the majority
rejected an agency shift in position regarding which employees at automobile 
dealerships are entitled to overtime pay.  Quoting extensively from Fox, 
the majority opinion faulted the Department of Labor for not taking into
account reliance interest shaped by the prior Department of Labor policy.
“In explaining its changed position, an agency must also be cognizant that 
longstanding policies may have ‘engendered serious reliance interests that 
must be taken into account,’ and ‘a reasoned explanation is needed for
disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by
the prior policy.’”50 
The circuit courts have applied Fox on a few occasions in exactly the 
way Justice Kennedy’s concurrence says they should—to deem unlawful 
agency action where the agency has not provided a reasonable explanation 
as to why the facts underlying its previous policy are no longer valid. In
Humane Society v Locke,51 relying upon Fox, the Ninth Circuit held that
the NMFS did not adequately explain its finding that sea lions had a “significant
negative impact” on the recovery of listed salmonid populations given earlier
factual findings by the NMFS that sea lions were not having a significant
negative impact.52 In Organized Village of Kake,53 the Ninth Circuit addressed 
a reversal by the United States Department of Agriculture regarding 
application of the “Roadless Rule,” limiting road construction and timber
harvesting in national forests. In 2001, the Department expressly found 
that exempting the Tongass National Forest from this Rule “would risk the 
loss of important roadless area [ecological] values.”54 Just two years later, 
relying on the factual record compiled in 2001, the Department reversed
course, finding that the application of the roadless rule to the Tongass was 
“unnecessary to maintain the roadless values.”55  Relying heavily on Fox
and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in particular, the Ninth Circuit found
that the Department had failed to explain why its 2001 findings regarding
ecological values no longer were true or mattered; the Department violated
49.  136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016) (citations omitted). 
50. Id. at 2126. 
51.  Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2010). 
52. Id. at 1048. 
53. Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 970 (9th Cir. 2015). 
54. Id. at 968. 
55. Id. 
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 because it “did not address its prior factual findings” in a meaningful 
II. THE CASE OF FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS
A. Factual and Legal Background
The Trump Administration’s recent signal that it intends to revisit the 
issue of fuel economy standards offers a perfect case study of the dangers 
of deference in an age of hyper-polarization—and of the extent to which 
an agency can and should be bound by prior rulemakings.57  Of course, 
the Obama-era fuel economy standards were themselves the product of
policy reversals—which highlights the difficulty of locating where to “begin” 
the analysis of any reversal—though these earlier reversals were arguably
different in that they were attempts to inject science into a decision-making 
framework that had had been largely devoid of it.  They were also, in part,
an attempt to resolve a seemingly intractable dispute between those who
wished to strengthen auto emissions standards under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 
and those who did not, and to harmonize the various regulatory proposals.58 
This particular drama was the result of two important policy reversals 
in the early days of the Obama Administration.  First, the Obama EPA issued
a long-delayed “endangerment finding” under the CAA regarding greenhouse
gas emissions.59  This finding—the first step toward regulating greenhouse
gases under the CAA—expressly referenced CAA Section 202(a) regarding 
mobile sources,60 setting the stage for EPA to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions through setting auto mileage standards.61  The reversal, in this
instance, stemmed from the fact that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Court chastised the EPA 
for refusing to make the finding and remanded to the agency to make such
 56. Id. at 967. 
57. See Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-term 
Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light Duty
Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg. 14,671 (Mar. 22, 2017) (40 C.F.R. pts. 523, 532, 533, 536 and 537).
58. See DANIEL SPERLING & DEBORAH GORDON, TWO BILLION CARS: DRIVING TOWARD
SUSTAINABILITY 47 (2009).
59. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (40
C.F.R. pt. 1). 
60. See id. at 66, 536. 
61.  As EPA later noted, there is no other way to regulate carbon dioxide emissions 
from cars other than through auto mileage standards. See Light- Duty Vehicle Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 74
Fed. Reg. 24,007, 25,327 (May 22, 2009) (40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, and 600; 49 C.F.R. pts.
531, 533, 536, et al.). 
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a finding unless it could justify a refusal based solely on the science,62  the
Bush Administration refused to issue this same endangerment finding.63 
The Bush Administration had taken the position that it would not issue an 
endangerment finding, not because of the science but because of the very
economic and policy considerations that the Supreme Court had rejected.64 
But before this refusal could be ruled upon through litigation, the Obama 
Administration came into office and reversed it.  In December 2009, the
Obama EPA issued a finding that greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.65 
The second major reversal had to do with granting California a waiver 
to enact its own auto emissions standards.  In 2002, California passed
legislation requiring the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to set 
greenhouse gas emission standards for vehicles.66  CARB’s regulations setting 
such standards, however, required a waiver of preemption under the CAA, 
which generally preempts state regulation of new motor vehicle emissions 
standards but which also provides that California may obtain a waiver of 
such preemption as long as certain statutory criteria are met.67  California
had made—and been granted—a number of waiver requests in the past.  
In fact, California had never been subject to an outright denial of a waiver 
request.68  But in 2008, after years of delay, the Bush Administration did just
that—it denied California a waiver to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from motor vehicles.69
 62. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
63. Id.
 64. See Letter from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, 
to Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA (July 10, 2008), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ 
postreview/OIRA_letter_to_EPA_7_10_08.pdf) (stating that the EPA staff’s draft rulemaking 
“cannot be considered Administration policy or representative of the views of the 
administration,” and that “trying to address greenhouse gas emissions through the existing 
provisions of the Clean Air Act will not only harm the U.S. economy, but will fail to provide 
an effective response to the global challenge of climate change.”).
65. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 
15, 2009)  (40 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
66. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 42823, § 43018.5; See 42 U.S.C.S § 7507 (1990).  
67. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 7543 (1990). The CAA also provides that other states may
choose to follow California’s standards in lieu of federal standards.
 68. GAO, Clean Air Act: Historical Information on EPA’s Process for Reviewing 
California Waiver Requests and Making Waiver Determinations (Jan. 16, 2009), http:// 
www.gao.gov/assets/100/95940.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMC3-SBV7]. 
69. See supra note 68.
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The following year, however, the Obama Administration reversed course 
and granted this same waiver.70  The Obama EPA openly noted that it was
rejecting the Bush-era interpretation of CAA Section 209(b)(1), stating
that the waiver denial “was based on an inappropriate interpretation of the
waiver provision.”71  While the Bush-era EPA had determined that “Congress
intended to allow California to promulgate only those state standards that 
address pollution problems that are local or regional,” and not global problems
such as climate change,72 the Obama EPA stated that Congress “intentionally 
provided California the broadest possible discretion in adopting the kind
of standards in its motor vehicle program that California determines are
appropriate to address air pollution problems and protect the health and 
welfare of its citizens.”73 
In the wake of these two policy reversals, automakers faced a conundrum,
with potentially conflicting California and federal regulation of auto mileage 
standards suddenly a distinct possibility.  “Thus, as the Obama Administration 
came into office, the auto industry was facing at least two regulators, and
probably three. And because of considerable potential for inconsistency
in their respective approaches, the prospect of confusion and conflict was 
significant.”74 
In order to harmonize the various regulatory approaches, the Obama 
Administration engaged in a joint effort among federal and state officials, 
along with environmentalists and auto company representatives, to hammer
out a “deal” that would be acceptable to all parties.75  The outlines of this deal
have been thoroughly examined elsewhere; for our purposes, we will highlight
a few salient aspects.76 
First, EPA and NHTSA conducted a joint rulemaking, minimizing any 
conflict between federal agencies and harmonizing the various approaches 
(both technical and statutory) that each agency was accustomed to operating 
under.77  The agencies also obtained non-binding “letters of commitment” 
70. See Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for 
New Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,745 (July 8, 2009). 
71. Id. at 32, 746. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
 74. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons
From the “Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 353 (2011) (Freeman notes that, in 
addition to CARB and EPA, federal fuel mileage standards were also within the jurisdiction of
the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA), under the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), and that all three agencies “possessed substantial 
flexibility under their respective statutes.”).
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 343, 343. 
77. Id. at 361–62. 
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from automakers agreeing in advance not to challenge the final rules.78 
Perhaps most importantly, the agencies formalized California’s commitment 
to the new standards in a unique way, by having the state agree to modify
its regulations “to treat compliance with the new federal standards as
equivalent to compliance with its own program.”79  California, like the 
automakers, used a “commitment letter” to memorialize its agreement based 
on certain explicit assumptions and understandings.80  Even so, a large part 
of what made this deal possible was mutual trust and a recognition that 
long-term certainty was in everyone’s best interest.81 
With the various stakeholders agreeing on the “deal” and agreeing not 
to challenge it in court, the Obama Administration was able to promulgate 
auto mileage standards that improved average required fuel economy
from 27.6 miles per gallon in 2011 to 34.1 miles per gallon in 2016.82 But 
this was only “Phase 1” of the overall fuel economy standards.83  Phase 2 
covered Model Years 2017-2025.84 By the end, the standards “are projected 
to require, on an average industry fleet wide basis, 163 grams/mile of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) in model year 2025, which is equivalent to 54.5 mpg if this 
level were achieved solely through improvements in fuel efficiency.”85 
However, there was one small catch in the rule—an attempt at future
flexibility that in hindsight seems less than wise.  As part of its rulemaking 
for the 2017-2025 model years, EPA made a commitment to conduct a 
78. Id. at 363. 
79. Id. at 365. 
80. See letter from Mary Nichols to Lisa Jackson and Ray LaHood, available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-10/documents/air-resources-board.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GBB9-EHEK]. 
81. See Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons 
From the “Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 369 (2011) (“All of this was done, 
not under a consent decree and with the imprimatur of the court in the context of litigation,
but voluntarily.  Thus the parties entered an agreement that is best described as a ‘trust, 
but verify’ regime”); Obama unveils mpg rule, gets broad support, NBC NEWS (May 19, 
2009) (quoting President Obama as saying that “this rule provides the clear certainty that 
will allow these companies to plan for a future in which they are building the cars of the
21st century”).
82. See 75 Fed. Reg. 25,323, 25,330. 
83. See Regulation for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Passenger Cars and Trucks,




85. See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,784. 
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“Midterm Evaluation” (MTE) of the light-duty vehicle standards for model 
years 2022-2025, in coordination with NHTSA and CARB.86  At the time, 
the MTE was billed as a response to the long lead-time before the 2022-
2025 standards were set to take effect.87  Formally, the MTE was designed 
to determine whether the light-duty standards for model years 2022-2025 
were “appropriate under section 202(a)” of the CAA.88  The standards that
were supposed to guide the MTE included a number of guiding factors. 
The regulation stated that the MTE “will be based on (1) A holistic assessment
of all of the factors considered by the agencies in setting standards, including 
those set forth in the rule and other relevant factors, and (2) the expected
impact of those factors on the manufacturers’ ability to comply, without
placing decisive weight on any particular factor or projection.”89 The
regulation also noted that “EPA would be legally bound to make a final 
decision, by April 1, 2018” regarding the MTE, but crucially, it gave no date 
before which the MTE could not be conducted.90 
The regulation did go on to note that a number of factors, such as the 
development of powertrain improvements, the impact on employment in
the auto sector, costs, and consumer acceptance of technologies, that would 
be used to inform EPA’s determination.91 Once the EPA made its decision, 
moreover, that would be a final agency action subject to judicial review.92 
The regulation also noted that “EPA will develop an administrative record
for that review that will be no less robust than that developed for the initial 
determination to establish the standards.  In the midterm evaluation, EPA 
will develop a robust record for judicial review that is the same kind of
record that would be developed and before a court for judicial review of
the adoption of standards.”93 
There was some disagreement, as reflected in the regulation, over EPA’s
statutory authority to conduct the MTE. Chrysler had argued that the MTE 
was authorized by CAA section 307(d) and the Administrative Procedure 
Act on the ground that EPA could “reconsider regulations based on new 
information,” while EPA disagreed that it was authorized by CAA section 
307(d) because “the mid-term evaluation is not a reconsideration of the 
86. White House Press Release, “President Obama Announces Historic 54.5 mpg
Fuel Efficiency Standard” (July 29, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2011/07/29/president-obama-announces-historic-545-mpg-fuel-efficiency-standard
[https://perma.cc/TJ59-EWFU].
87. See supra note 85, at 62,784. 
88. See id. at 62,784.































   
 




DANA-BARSA (DO NOT DELETE) 	10/8/2018 1:54 PM
[VOL. 9:  231, 2017–18] Judicial Review
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
standards under that provision.”94  Instead, EPA’s position was that the MTE 
was authorized by “EPA’s general authority to establish emissions standards
under section 202(a).”95 
In order to inform this decision and to prepare an appropriate record, 
EPA, NHTSA, and CARB had to jointly prepare a draft Technical Assessment
Report (TAR).96  The agencies did just that, completing the Draft TAR on 
July 18, 2016.97  The TAR is an exhaustive 1,200 page document designed
to assess the technologies available to meet the standards and two possible 
compliance pathways to meet those standards.98 
The TAR concluded that “[a] wider range of technologies exist for 
manufacturers to use to meet the MY2022-2025 standards, and at costs that
are similar or lower, than those projected in the 2012 rule.”99  The TAR also
concluded that: 
 “Advanced gasoline vehicle technologies will continue to
be the predominant technologies, with modest levels of strong 
hybridization and very low levels of full electrification (plug- 
in vehicles) needed to meet the standards,” and 
 “The car/truck mix reflects updated consumer trends that are
informed by a range of factors including economic growth, 
gasoline prices, and other macro-economic trends. However,
as the standards were designed to yield improvements across 
the light duty vehicle fleet, irrespective of consumer choice, 
updated trends are fully accommodated by the footprint-
based standards.”100 
In other words, the TAR assumed that gasoline engines would continue 
to be the predominant engine form and also took into account updated 
consumer trends.  Even so, the TAR saw no need to weaken the standards. 
The TAR also evaluated employment impacts, vehicle safety effects, and 
94. Id. at 62,786. 
95. Id.
 96. Id. at 62,784. 
97. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (NHTSA), Light Duty CAFE Midterm 
Evaluation, https://www.nhtsa.gov/corporate-average-fuel-economy/light-duty-cafe-midterm- 
evaluation [https://perma.cc/YQ7D-LQQQ].
98. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Cal. Air Resources Bd., ENVTL. PROT.
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alternative fuel infrastructure, and came to a similar conclusion.101  “Federal
Agencies spent years conducting a rigorous ‘midterm’ review that included
research by experts at EPA labs, technical analysis from experts across
academia and input from a wide range of stakeholders, including automakers. 
This in-depth analysis show[ed], conclusively, that automakers can improve 
efficiency—and, thanks to technological innovation, they can do it at lower 
cost than federal agencies anticipated when these standards were developed.”102 
Yet automakers still balked, as gasoline prices were low and they were
making considerable profits from light-duty vehicles.103  Then politics came
into play, namely in the upcoming Presidential election.  When, in November 
2016, President Trump was unexpectedly elected, EPA moved up the timetable 
for making a final determination regarding auto mileage standards, even 
as automakers strenuously opposed “locking in” those standards.104  On
January 12, 2017, shortly before Donald Trump would become President,
the Obama EPA made a final determination that the 2022-2025 standards 
were indeed “appropriate” under the CAA.105 
But this was not the end of the story.  In February 2017, shortly after 
Trump took office, the chief executives of 18 automakers asked Trump to
reopen the MTE process.106  A spokeswoman for the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers claimed “the process was truncated” and that automakers
were trying to “just restore the process.”107  The following month, Trump 
himself visited with auto executives and workers in Michigan, where he 
101. Id. at ES-5. 
102. See William K. Reilly & Kenneth Kimmell, Automakers Shouldn’t Fight Emissions 
Standards, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/
automakers-shouldnt-fight-emissions-standards.html [https://perma.cc/6TW2-K2JJ]. 
103. Adele Peters, Automakers Say They’re Going Electric–But They’re Also Lobbying 
for Weaker Fuel Standards, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.
com/40497293/automakers-say-theyre-going-electric-but-theyre-also-lobbying-for-
weaker-fuel-standards [https://perma.cc/86LD-EEFB]; see also Chester Dawson, Gas Prices
Take a Backseat for Auto Makers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
gas-prices-take-a-backseat-for-auto-makers-1484044201 [https://perma.cc/PQB3-UQJG].
104. See David Shepardson, EPA Locks in 2025 Fuel Efficiency Rules, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 
2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-automakers-idUSKBN14X1Q6 [https://perma.
cc/HVT2-N3XU].
105. See Letter from Gina McCarthy to Stakeholders, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jan.
12, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/mte-stakeholder- 
letter-2017-01-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/95G2-SAXG]. See also Final Determination on
the Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards Under the Midterm Election, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 1, 29 (2017),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100QQ91.pdf [https://perma.cc/K66R-7U9J]. 
106. See Ryan Beene, Auto CEOs Ask Trump to Revisit Obama-era Fuel Efficiency 
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announced his own determination that the MTE should be reconsidered.108 
Trump claimed at that event that he would encourage growth in the U.S. 
Auto sector and that “[t]he assault on the American auto industry is over.”109 
Then on March 22, 2017, the EPA under the Trump administration published
a “Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-
Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 
2022-2025 Light Duty Vehicles.”110 The EPA claimed in this notice that it 
had “inherent authority to reconsider past decisions,” citing FCC v. Fox
to support its position.111 In other words, Scott Pruitt, the EPA administrator,
signaled that the EPA was “ready to ignore years of scientific and economic
analyses that underpinned the agency’s decision” in the MTE that standards
should remain in place.112 
B. Possible Avenues of Litigation 
Assuming that the EPA reverses course and uses the new MTE process 
to weaken mileage standards, then the question becomes what the court’s 
challenge to this reversal will look like and what standard of review the 
court will apply. There will certainly be serious questions about whether 
the EPA lacks a regulatory or statutory basis for revisiting the MTE.  However,
for purposes of this paper, we will focus on the factual challenges, namely
whether any new rulemaking conducted pursuant to the EPA revisiting the
MTE violates the APA, and whether it meaningfully addresses the facts that
the EPA relied on when it issued its final decision. 
First, the EPA will likely claim that it has “inherent authority to reconsider 
past decisions” and that such authority alone is sufficient to justify revisiting 
the MTE.113  However, the EPA will probably lose this argument.  Recently,
the EPA made a similar claim that it has “inherent authority” to stay
 108. See John Lippert et al., Trump to Meet with Auto Leaders, Workers in Michigan 
Visit, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20170
313/NEWS01/170319950/trump-to-meet-with-auto-leaders-workers-in-michigan-visit
[https://perma.cc/WCJ9-AMCH]. 
109. See Nick Carey & David Shepardson, Big Win for Automakers as Trump Orders 
Fuel Economy Standards Review, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-trump-autos-idUSKBN16M2C5 [https://perma.cc/ZM23-4H43].
110.  82 Fed. Reg. 14,671-01, 14,671 (proposed Mar. 22, 2017). 
111. Id.
 112. William K. Reilly et. al., Automakers Shouldn’t Fight Emissions Standards, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/automakers-
shouldnt-fight-emissions-standards.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/E2US-DBVB].
113.  82 Fed. Reg. at 14,671. 
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the Obama-era methane rule—a claim that the D.C. Circuit shot down by
noting that it is “axiomatic” that “administrative agencies may act only 
pursuant to authority delegated to them by Congress,” and that the statute 
hadn’t given the EPA the power to issue such a stay.114 
Thus, the EPA will have to grapple with the facts.  The EPA will likely
argue that the regulation contemplates a “holistic” review process and that
this allows a wide range of factual justifications for revisiting the MTE.115 
However, the problem here is that the EPA has identified no factual or
procedural defect with the original MTE decision.  Instead, the EPA stated
that “[i]n 2012, EPA committed to continuing to coordinate development 
of its Clean Air Act (CAA) section 202(a)(1) (42 U.S.C. 7521(a)) emission 
standards with NHTSA’s development of CAFE standards for light-duty 
vehicles, but did not do so in development and publication of EPA’s January
12, 2017 Midterm Evaluation.”116  It is unclear whether this statement
is sufficient to justify revisiting the MTE.  While the 2012 regulation does 
contemplate that “EPA and NHTSA will finalize their actions related to 
MYs 2022–2025 standards concurrently,”117 there appears to be no requirement 
that the EPA withhold its MTE until NHTSA has finalized its own CAFE 
standards. The 2012 regulation also stated that “EPA, NHTSA and CARB 
will jointly prepare a draft Technical Assessment Report (TAR) to inform
the EPA’s determination on the appropriateness of the GHG standards and 
to inform NHTSA’s rulemaking for the CAFE standards for MY 2022– 
2025” and that the “EPA and NHTSA will consult and coordinate in developing
EPA’s determination on whether the MY2022—2025 GHG standards are 
appropriate under section 202(a) and NHTSA’s NPRM.”118 
The problem for EPA is that EPA and NHTSA did jointly prepare the
TAR and did consult and coordinate in developing EPA’s determination
whether the standards were appropriate.  NHTSA was involved in drafting 
the TAR itself—Chapter 13 of which presents NHTSA’s detailed technical 
support for the rule—and expressly used its CAFE model to support its 
and EPA’s results.119  Moreover, as noted supra, nowhere did EPA state that 
it had to wait until NHTSA came up with separate CAFE standards before 
it made its own MTE determination.  While EPA now says that NHTSA’s
114.  Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
115. 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,784  (Oct. 15, 2012) (The MTE “will be based on (1) A 
holistic assessment of all of the factors considered by the agencies in setting standards,
including those set forth in the rule and other relevant factors, and (2) the expected impact 
of those factors on the manufacturers’ ability to comply, without placing decisive weight 
on any particular factor or projection.”). 
116.  82 Fed. Reg. at 14,671. 
117.  77 Fed. Reg. at 62,784. 
118. Id.
 119. See Draft TAR, at 13-1.
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CAFE standards would be “appropriate” for it to consider,120 the risk is
that this standard is far too broad to support any kind of judicial review, 
and comes perilously close to the agency claiming it has “inherent authority”
to revisit its rules, a claim that courts have rejected, as we note supra.121 
Moreover, a court may also decide that EPA’s broad claim that it can revisit
past decisions whenever “appropriate” provides no meaningful basis for
judicial review because it provides no justiciable metric by which to decide 
whether such an action comports with the APA.  On this basis alone, a court
may decide that EPA has exceeded its authority by revisiting the MTE. 
A related challenge is that EPA will have to provide an adequate factual 
basis for revisiting the MTE under an entirely new rulemaking.  This is 
contemplated in the regulation itself, which states that EPA “will initiate 
a rulemaking” if it determines that the standards are not appropriate.  It is
also contemplated by the courts, which have made it clear that agencies
must “use the same procedures when they amend or repeal a rule as they
used to issue the rule in the first instance.”122 
This new rulemaking will presumably have to explain why the facts laid
out in the TAR are wrong and why the agency is reversing course in order 
to meaningfully address its prior factual findings.  Here, the degree of scrutiny 
that a court will apply can prove decisive.  As explained supra, a court may
be justified in conducting a searching review of the extent to which the agency
addresses what it did before—and the agency’s stated rationales—given 
the risk that politics has undermined the agency’s scientific and factual 
predicates for rulemaking.  This is especially true because the Clean Air 
Act is an essentially science-driven statute, and the EPA is supposed to be 
guided by science when making its decisions.123
 120. See 82 Fed. Reg. 54 (Mar. 22, 2017), citing 40 CFR 86.1818–12(h)(1)(vii) (listing
as one of the factors EPA should consider in the Mid-Term Evaluation “[t]he impact of
the greenhouse gas emission standards on the Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards 
and a national harmonized program”). 
121. In other words, if the agency may reopen a prior decision anytime it feels it is 
“appropriate” to do so, there would be no limit to such revisions, making this claim 
indistinguishable from the claim that the agency has “inherent authority” to revisit past
decisions. 
122.  Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015); Clean Air Council, 862 
F.3d at 9. 
123. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also Coal. for
Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding a quartet of
EPA’s CAA’s rules, including its endangerment finding). 
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Thus, a court will face the serious issue of whether EPA’s statement— 
about revisiting the MTE because NHTSA hadn’t yet set a maximum 
feasible CAFE standard—is a mere pretext for an essentially political
decision and is designed to circumvent the factors in the statute and regulation 
that were supposed to guide its decision.  This is especially true if NHTSA 
suddenly claims that the “maximum feasible” CAFE standard requires a 
weakening of the standards that it said, just a few months before, were not 
only feasible but desirable as well, and if EPA similarly claims that the 
“appropriate” emissions standards are less stringent than what it recently
claimed. 
III. OBJECTIONS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS
With the preceding in mind, it is useful to explore the possible objections
to a searching, hard look review of agency shifts in position following 
elections. Such objections include: (1) such review will cause more non-
ideological mistakes by judges due to their lack of technical expertise, and 
(2) such review will worsen partisanship and ideological excess by freeing 
ideologically-driven judges to override policy shifts based on their own 
preferences (i.e., Republican judges will strike down agency policies after 
a Democratic President is elected and vice versa).  We do not take either
objection lightly but argue that, overall, the benefits of searching review,
especially ex ante on agency policy formation prior to any judicial challenge, 
outweigh possible costs in our current era of hyper-polarization. These
objections, however, do underscore the importance of preserving key
institutional protections against hyper-polarization and its harmful effects 
—the rating of appointees by the American Bar Association, Senate 
confirmation only after a hearing, and the political taboo against court-
expansion and court-packing schemes for partisan reasons.124 These institutional
features help assure that any shifts in the partisan affiliations of the judiciary 
occur gradually, relative to the sharp shifts that can occur every two and
four years in the other branches of government. 
124. The strongly negative reaction across the political spectrum to a recent proposal 
by Professor Calebresi that the Republican Congress radically expands the number of
federal judges so that President Trump can secure a majority of Republican appointees in
every Court of Appeals suggest that this taboo, thankfully, still has force. Linda Greenhouse, A
Conservative Plan to Weaponize the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opinion/conservatives-weaponize-federal-courts.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/97UF-RMK3]; William H. Pryor, Jr., Conservatives Should Oppose
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As a preliminary matter, one needs to acknowledge that formal standards
of review—whatever they are—may matter less than administrative law
scholars and commentators might believe.  There is some empirical work
that suggests a lack of relationship between standard of review and how
often agency action is upheld.125  But the vigor with which standards of review 
are debated provides some evidence that the people closest to and with the
greatest knowledge of administrative law think they do matter, and that in 
itself suggests they may.126  Moreover, our argument is that, whatever judges 
call their standard of review, they should apply a searching one in response 
to polarization and its effects on agency determinations. 
With respect to the non-ideological mistakes point, our main rejoinder 
is that judges review what agencies say as to why they acted as they did. 
Agencies thus can explain that they are relying on their expertise and if they
genuinely are relying on expertise, they can provide cogent explanations, 
ideally backed up by external experts without a direct pecuniary stake in 
the issue at hand. If (to respond to Vermeule’s and Gerson’s argument) 
there are genuine factual uncertainties, it is better for an agency to explain 
those uncertainties and insist that in the face of those uncertainties they 
are entitled to choose how to proceed. We do not see how it can be better
for agencies to deny uncertainties and claim a certitude the factual record 
simply cannot support.
 125. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 515 (2011) (“With one 
exception, the studies found that a court’s choice among six review doctrines had little, if
any, effect on the outcome of cases. Courts at all levels of the federal judiciary uphold agency
actions in about 70% of cases, no matter whether the court applies Chevron, Skidmore, 
State Farm, Universal Camera, or de novo review.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the 
Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011) (“With 
one notable exception, the studies suggest that a court’s choice of which doctrine to apply
in reviewing an agency action is not an important determinant of outcomes in the Supreme
Court or the circuit courts.”); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 
137 (2010) (“The outcomes of actual cases prove the point: whether the question is one of 
fact, law, or arbitrariness, whether the agency procedures were formal or informal, whether 
judicial deference is required or not, the courts—even though in theory they would apply
different degrees of scrutiny to each of these questions—reverse agencies slightly less than 
one third of the time.”). The literature also confirms that courts uphold agency action in
the great majority of cases, regardless of the applicable standard of review. Pierce & Weiss,
supra, at 515; Pierce, supra, at 83; Zaring, supra, at 137. 
126. See Levin, supra note 12, at 555–56. 
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As a matter of prevailing legal culture, and for institutional reasons,
judges are inclined to defer if faced with a plausible technical argument
for deference. Judges and legal commentators now primarily debate what
deference is due with respect to questions of statutory and regulatory
interpretation,127 precisely because, we would argue, deference on factual/ 
technical determinations is so accepted in our legal culture. Moreover,
deference on factual/technical determinations is simply easier for judges
than wading into a subject matter terrain with respect to which they lack
professional credentials and training and explaining why they see insufficient
grounds for deferring. Given all that, the greater risk (putting judicial 
partisanship aside) is that judges will defer based on almost nothing rather 
than that they will override a reasoned, expertise-grounded, fact-based
explanation provided by an agency.
But of course judges do not judge free from ideology or, in particular, 
ideology associated with partisanship. Judges are part of the culture of
political polarization in the United States at large.128 Also, the judicial 
selection process has become more partisan and arguably has resulted in 
the appointment of more partisan judges.129 Yet there are forces that temper
 127. See, e.g., Bradley George Hubbard, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations 
First Advanced in Litigation? The “Chevron” Two-step and the “Skidmore” Shuffle, 80 U. CHI.
L. REV. 447 (2013); Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 527 (2014-2015); William N. Eskridge Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: 
An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUMBIA 
L. REV. 1727 (2010); Stephen M. Johnson, Advancing Auer in an Era of Retreat, 41 WM.
& MARY L. & POL’Y REV. 551 (2016-2017).
128. See Dan Kahan et al., Comment, Ideology or Situation Sense: An Experimental 
Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 
352–53 (2016) (“The evidence, according to experts, vindicates the public’s impression 
that judges (despite their own protestations) are just ‘junior varsity politicians’”); see also
Richard E. Redding & N. Dickson Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’ Socio-Political Attitudes
on the Judgment of Social Science in Legal Decisionmaking, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1999)
(finding support for the view that ideology or attitudes influence judicial decisions regarding
empirical issues); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 116 (Harv. Univ. Press
2008) (assessing that cultural orientation influences judicial assessments of empirical evidence).
129. See generally David Leonhardt, How to End the Politicization of the Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/opinion/how-to-end-the-
politicization-of-the-courts.html [https://perma.cc/7R5L-62N2]; James Robertson, The Judicial
Nomination War Started with Bork. Let’s End it with Gorsuch, WASH. POST (Mar. 15,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-judicial-nomination-war-started-with-
bork-lets-end-it-with-gorsuch/2017/03/15/3effeb4e-0990-11e7-b77c-0047d15a24e0_story.
html?utm_term=.bb4733211702 [https://perma.cc/9KGW-JCPZ; Nina Totenberg, Robert 
Bork’s Supreme Court Nomination ‘Changed Everything, Maybe Forever,’ NPR (Dec. 19, 
2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2012/12/19/167645600/robert-borks-supreme-
court-nomination-changed-everything-maybe-forever [https://perma.cc/BR54-65JF]; John M.
Walker Jr., The Unfortunate Politicization of Judicial Confirmation Hearings, THE ATLANTIC 
(July 9, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/07/the-unfortunate-
politicization-of-judicial-confirmation-hearings/259445/ [https://perma.cc/J24N-YDN7].
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partisanship in the judging of agency action. Agency rules are reviewed
directly by a Court of Appeals, and there often will be some diversity in
political affiliations among the relevant judges in three-judge panels and 
(where granted) en banc panels. Where a panel has a judge appointed by
both a Republican President and a Democrat one, there is some evidence
that the role of partisanship in decisions is substantially tempered, as compared
to panels where all judges are affiliated with the same party. Panel diversity
checks, if imperfectly, the distortions of political polarization.130 
Of course, an agency may draw an unusually favorable panel, but,
crucially, agencies do not know the partisan make-up of the panel they
will draw when a rule or other action ultimately is reviewed by a court. 
Operating ex ante, and in a regime where policy shifts do receive a hard look,
agency actors, especially if risk averse, presumably will try to go about
formulating policy and assembling records that do take account of and address 
available facts, including those more often relied upon by members of the 
“other” political party and in particular those relied upon by the previous 
administration.  We thus would assume that, where we see agency shifts after 
elections, they will be at least somewhat more grounded factually under a 
regime of searching review than under one without such review. 
Moreover, even in these partisan times, and even when certain Circuits 
have become heavily dominated by judges thought to be affiliated with 
one political party, judges’ training as lawyers and role-identification as 
neutral authorities may lead them to act in a more objective, less ideologically- 
polarized fashion than Executive branch personnel and the party activists 
and donors who impose pressure on them. To take one recent example, appellate 
judges appointed by Republican Presidents joined ones appointed by 
Democratic Presidents in faulting a Trump Executive Order banning entrants
into the United States from certain predominantly Muslim nations, on the 
grounds that the ban was not based on credible factual suppositions.131 
130. See Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 
58 DUKE L.J. 2193, 2197–98 (2009) (suggesting that mandatory mixed panels are the best, 
but not readily achievable, solution to politicization and reviewing the evidence regarding
panel composition effects, the bulk of which suggests the benefits of having at least one 
judge appointed by a Democrat and a Republican on every panel). See also Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006); Kevin M. Quinn, The Academic Study of Decisionmaking 
on Multimember Courts, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1493 (2012); Emerson H. Tiller, The Law and 
Positive Political Theory of Panel Effects, 44 J. OF LEGAL STUD. S1, S35-S58 (Jan. 2015). 
131. See International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 592 (4th
Cir. 2017) (“Based on this evidence, we find that Plaintiffs have more than plausibly alleged 
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Experimental research by Daniel Kahan and others provides some support 
for what we observed in the Fourth Circuit.  This research suggests that
lawyers and judges, regardless of where they fall on a polarization scale,
reach more grounded, less ideological decisions on questions of statutory
construction than non-lawyers. Kahan and his colleagues postulate that 
“[i]t is thus possible that the professional judgment of the judge, as an expert 
neutral decisionmaker, embodies exactly the form of information processing 
most likely to counteract identity-protective reasoning” that lead others to
rely on what might be termed “alternative facts.”132 Lawyers and judges
“reliably fix their attention on pertinent elements of case ‘situation types,’
thereby immunizing them from the distorting influence that identity-
protective cognition exerts on the judgments of legally untrained members 
of the public.”133 
Another possible objection to our approach is that it would not make
policymaking any less inconsistent, but simply incentivize agencies to ground 
their policy shifts in normative claims—values or ideology—rather than 
factual ones.134 For example, the Trump Administration could seek to justify
laxer fuel economy standards in a rulemaking on the explicit grounds that
any loss in environmental benefits is simply less important than avoiding 
short-term economic burdens on automobile makers, even though the previous 
standards concededly could be met without any greater costs than the
that EO-2’s stated national security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for its 
religious purpose. And having concluded that the “facially legitimate” reason proffered by
the government is not “bona fide,” we no longer defer to that reason and instead may “look 
behind” EO-2.”) (opinion joined by all Republican and Democratic-appointed judges). 
132. See Dan M. Kahan et. al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense?” An Experimental
Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 
375 (2016).
133. Id. at 375. There are to be sure limits in the Kahan et al. analysis: most notably, it 
brackets the question of the role of ideology in actually litigated cases on the grounds that 
those are the cases where ideological differences most come into play, but those are precisely
the cases of greatest interest in assessing the impact of ideology. See id. at 358–63.
Moreover, as the authors acknowledge, the scope of the experimental study is necessarily
limited. See also Larsen, supra note 10 (discussing possible relevance of the Kahan et al. 
experimental work regarding judges). 
134. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. E.P.A., 682 F.3d 1032, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 
is one example of an agency changing policy based on its having a different normative
assessment of competing considerations than the agency during the previous administration. In
that case, the D.C. Circuit affirmed an agency rule that eliminated an “opt-out” provision 
that exempted certain owner-occupied housing from a rule regulating renovation and 
remodeling activities that created health hazards arising from lead paint. As the Court
explained, “the petitioners are correct: EPA did not rely on new facts, but rather on a 
reevaluation of which policy would be better in light of the facts.” The Court concluded
that because EPA acted transparently and did not purport to rely on factual expertise but
rather openly re-evaluated its policy based on a higher valuation of human life and health,
Fox did not require the agency to “explain away” previous factual records.
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previous administration estimated.  Whether such a strategy would work 
would depend on the court’s answer to the legal question of whether the 
applicable statute and regulations (including the APA) allow agencies the
discretion to shift policy based on that sort of justification.135 
More honest, transparent statements of the values driving agency policy 
shifts could enhance public debate and democratic discourse, at least if the
courts are able to sort between values “puffery” and genuine, cogent values- 
based rationales. In sum, genuinely hard look review may produce either more 
factually-grounded agency decisions (including, sometimes, the decision
not to shift policy after an election) or more transparently value-driven 
ones, both of which may be preferable to agency decisions ostensibly rooted
in, but poorly supported by, the range of facts available to the agencies. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Agency policy shifts do not occur in a political or cultural vacuum. In 
our current age of hyper-polarization and alternative facts, the case for 
robust judicial deference to agency’s invocation of technocratic expertise 
is weakened, but by no means negated, when an agency changes course after 
the election of a President from a different party than his or her predecessor.
Rather, because it is both true that agencies have distinctive expertise judges
lack and hyper-polarization necessarily calls into question the good 
faith of agency invocations of technical expertise as a rationale for policy
shifts, the federal courts should require agencies to identify and explain 
the available factual evidence and, in particular, to meaningfully account for 
the factual evidence known to and factual record relied upon by previous
administrations.  Supreme Court precedent allows and indeed compels courts
to do just that, notwithstanding how Fox has been read by some commentators. 
For their part, legislators and regulators who want fact-based government
administration can and should facilitate meaningful judicial review of
agency policy shifts by drafting laws and regulation that require agencies 
to tie policy reviews and adjustments to relevant factual determinations 
135. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“A change in administration 
brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an 
agency’s reappraisal of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within 
bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate 
priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.”). As noted above, it also would
be relevant whether the agency’s values rationale was sufficiently detailed, specific and 
consistent so as to warrant being credited as a good faith rationale amenable to genuine 
judicial review. See supra note 17. 
 263




      
 
 
DANA-BARSA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/8/2018 1:54 PM
and redeterminations. The courts cannot be expected to be free from
hyperpolarization or to be its sole remedy, but they can play a very important
part in mitigating the negative effects of hyperpolarization on the administrative 
state.
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